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Desire: The Proper Home of Aristotle’s Voluntary
I. Introduction: Aristotle’s ‘the Voluntary’
Aristotle’s ethics have been studied for thousands of years—a period after which one
might expect his teachings to have been comprehensively understood. But there remains at least
one area of his ethics that has not. This is an area which I have found to be intimately connected
not only with the rest of his ethics, but with Aristotle’s convictions about the human soul itself.
It is Aristotle’s discussion of the voluntary (hekousion). In contemporary conversation, we may
commonly associate voluntariness with action, but, for Aristotle, action is not the only thing that
can be voluntary; states, motions, and even the reception of actions can all be voluntary. For this
reason, interpreters of Aristotle often use the phrasing ‘the voluntary’ in a substantive way.
Much of the difficulty that one encounters when trying to interpret Aristotle’s accounts of
the voluntary, which are given separately in his Eudemian Ethics (EE) and Nicomachean Ethics
(EN), as well as in passages shared by both of those works, finds it origin in two sources. First,
the Nicomachean Ethics has long been treated as the standard and more refined version of
Aristotle’s ethics. But as my reader will learn, the account of voluntariness given there is
significantly less robust (even if the language is ostensibly clearer), so anyone attempting to
build an understanding based primarily on the EN account will struggle. In fact, it has become
clear that the account Aristotle gives in EN largely presupposes the work he does in EE1. Second,
the EE account, while being comparatively more robust, presupposes without making explicit a
great deal of work that Aristotle does elsewhere, such as in De Anima and Metaphysics. If one
does not trace these lines of thought—lines which run deep in Aristotle’s astoundingly unified
system—one will never understand what he means when he says ‘voluntary’.
Aristotle’s EE account seems to conclude with by defining voluntary action according to
two negative criteria: that it is neither forced (bia) nor due to ignorance. The EN account begins
by reiterating that definition and then examines what follows from it in relation to some
commonly held views. Certain statements that Aristotle draws in EE seem to be contradicted in
EN. For example, in the former treatise he states that actions performed under necessity (ananke;
often translated in this context as compulsion) are involuntary, while in the latter he concludes
that they are, while similar to involuntary actions, ultimately voluntary.
1

For this insight, the world is indebted to Susan Sauvé Meyer, who, in her work, Aristotle on Moral Responsibility
(2011), comes strikingly close to seeing the relationship between action and desire which grounds my interpretation.
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Beyond this logical progression exhibited from EE to EN2, there seems to be a different
audience to both texts. EE seems more oriented toward a student of Aristotle’s philosophy in
general, while EN is explicitly directed toward students of ethics and law (which, for Aristotle,
amount to pretty much the same thing). Now, some interpreters take this shift in audience to
have been the source of the change in certain positions between each treatise. I cannot see why
Aristotle would think different things were true based on who he was addressing. What seems
like a far more plausible explanation is that Aristotle developed his theory more in the period
between the writing of EE and EN. I do, though, believe that the audience for which he was
writing influenced the style in which he presented information. This would seem to account for
the clearer and more straightforward style of the EN.
On the assumption that Aristotle maintained any degree of consistency in his work, a
comprehensive understanding must be able to unify and explain not only the unproblematic
conclusions which Aristotle articulates, but also the problematic ones, such as those about
necessity, the voluntariness of suffering, what non-voluntary means, if not involuntary, and how
states like ignorance or even characteristics can be voluntary.
Some interpreters have thrown their hands up in defeat, claiming that Aristotle
was himself confused by his own terminological choices, others have chosen to ignore the
existence of the aforementioned problematic conclusions, and still others have acknowledged
that those conclusions appear problematic, while expressing faith that Aristotle merely failed to
articulate clearly the connections he was making. From this final set of commentators come
many attempts to replicate Aristotle’s process of reasoning in certain cases, none of which, in my
opinion, have done so satisfactorily.
I contend that I have found a single defining principle (which Aristotle was likely reliant
on) which unifies and underlies each claim Aristotle makes about voluntariness: F is voluntary if
and only if it depends on agent A’s desire whether F or not-F comes to be. What is most
significant about this principle is that, when applied to action, it can cleanly ground for
conclusions which others have struggled to understand. Not only can this principle unify and
found the two distinct negative criteria by which Aristotle appears to define the voluntary, it can
unproblematically account for each of the troubling conclusions which nobody has yet succeeded
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Which I do take to be a progression. On my understanding, when Aristotle’s claims conflict between the two
works, his conclusions in EN are more consistent with his defining principle.
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in interpreting on Aristotle’s terms. Further, the definition, which I propose not as an
interpretational principle but as Aristotle’s own, elucidates the reasons Aristotle gave
contradictory claims about necessity. Armed with this definition, one can see the realization
Aristotle had between EE and EN which changed his conclusion.
First, I must point out that much of the work in formulating this definition was done by
Sarah Broadie in chapter 3, “The Voluntary,” of her book, Ethics with Aristotle (1993). My
contribution comes in the specific connection of Aristotle’s voluntary to desire.
This work is dedicated to exploring how this principle applies in the case of action, and the way I
approach establishing my proposed definition reflects that. I will start by contextualizing the
voluntary within Aristotle’s Ethics by clarifying its link to character. Next, I give an overview of
Broadie’s derivation of the version of the principle which focuses simply on causal responsibility
from EE II.6, pointing out important features of II.6 which Broadie’s principle does not make
explicit. After the principle of causal responsibility is firmly grounded, I will examine specific
features of what Aristotle identifies as action (praxis) and how an agent might be causally
responsible for action, that is, through desire (orexis). Having done this, I give my proposed
definition of voluntary action, which adapts my modification of Broadie’s principle explicitly to
Aristotelian action: an action is voluntary if and only if the action’s responsible cause is the
agent’s desire for that action’s real end.3
Finally, I briefly analyze how this definition applies in cases of actions which Aristotle
classifies as not voluntary because of having been performed due to ignorance, his introduction
of the class of non-voluntary (oukh hekousion) actions in addition to straightforwardly
involuntary (akousion) actions, and his inconsistent conclusions about actions performed due to
necessity.4
II. Texts and Terms
My argument in this paper relies heavily on textual interpretation of Aristotle’s original
works. Because of the nature of the process of translating a 2500-year-old philosophical text into
3

As I have stated before, I am as yet unsure whether this revision of the defining principle as it applies to action also
underlies the voluntariness of states. If it does underly the voluntariness of states, it must be through actions which
cause those states to come to be.
4
While I am convinced that the defining principle needn’t be applied to non-actions such as states of character and
culpable ignorance through the mediation of voluntary action, but can be applied without mediation, I will but
briefly dwell on this claim. I do not believe anyone has yet made such a claim; Broadie, for example, concludes that
the above count as voluntary when they have been brought about as a result of voluntary action. Since I am not yet
well-enough equipped to defend my position, I will not yet attempt to do so.

3

4
contemporary English, there does not exist a translation that fully captures the intricacies of
Aristotle’s meaning. Compounding the problem is the fact that each reader brings to the table
her own understanding of the meaning of commonly used English words. I do not mean to say
that translators have not successfully made Aristotle’s thought accessible to contemporary
readers, but that any investigation and exposition must eventually turn to the language in which
Aristotle wrote. With this in mind, I would like to leave a brief note about the texts and terms I
will be using.
1. Texts
There are three ethical treatises attributed in some way to Aristotle. Two of them are
generally accepted to reflect Aristotle’s own work, and the other, Magna Moralia (MM), is
understood to follow Aristotle’s thought, but not be the result of his own work. Because I am
concerned in this essay with uncovering a not-yet-recognized definition according to which
Aristotle wrote, I have chosen not to include Magna Moralia in my investigation.
The other two, Eudemian Ethics (EE) and Nicomachean Ethics (EN), come to us sharing
similar structures to each other, and they even feature three identical books. Books IV, V, and
VI of EE are the same in form and content as V-VII of EN. When I am citing from these books,
I will refer to them as Aristotle’s Common Ethics, or CE, and I will give the both book
designations, first the EE then the EN. For example, when I refer to EE IV which is also EN V, I
will do so as CE IV/V.
The translations from which I quote are listed in the table below:
Nicomachean Ethics (EN; incl. common books)

Martin Ostwald, 1962

Eudemian Ethics (EE)

Anthony Kenny, 2011

De Anima (DA)

Hippocrates G. Apostle, 1981

De Motu Animalium (MA)

Martha Craven Nussbaum, 1978

Metaphysics (Met.)

William David Ross

2. Terms
Among the many reasons that nobody has yet arrived at a satisfactory understanding of
Aristotle’s account of the voluntary is that most readers conflate Aristotle’s terminological
choices with the meanings of the words that translators have chosen to render Aristotle’s terms.
From this mistake, such issues arise as the utterly ridiculous argument that Aristotle confused
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himself by choosing to define a structurally ambiguous term which sometimes means ‘voluntary’
and sometimes means ‘willing’.
This is such an insidious problem because, for most of the important terms Aristotle uses,
he precisely defines them in one or two places in his entire body of work and then presupposes
those definitions everywhere else. Anyone who is unprepared to go on a for Aristotle’s
definition of a certain term is bound to fall short of comprehension. To make clear the
significance of certain terms, I have decided to often include reminders of their Greek forms
alongside their English renderings. I have also selected only one or two renderings of each
important term, and I will make clear when appropriate what those are, and always and only use
those to render Aristotle’s corresponding term. Sometimes I have had to alter translated
quotations in order to maintain consistency, but I judge my reader’s ability to track Aristotle’s
terms throughout the arguments absolutely necessary.
III. Situating the Voluntary: Character
It should go without saying that Aristotle’s focus in each of his discussions of the
voluntary is a person’s character. One question often argued over by commentators is whether
Aristotle is concerned in his Ethics with how to positively shape one’s own character, how to
positively shape another’s character, or simply what good character looks like. Personally, I find
it less than obvious that the first two do not presuppose the last. If we are concerned with how to
positively shape anyone’s character, we must first know what good character looks like. Further,
I think Aristotle is thoroughly convinced that one’s own character must be already good before
one may try to improve the character of another. But that last remark is beside the point of this
essay. I am convinced that Aristotle’s goal when discussing the voluntary in his ethical works is
to establish a way to identify someone of good character.5
1. Character, Characteristics, and Pleasure
Perhaps a good question to answer at this point is this: What does Aristotle mean by
‘character’? He defines both character and characteristics (sometimes also referred to as
dispositions) slightly differently, and the differentiae will later take on particular significance.
Character is specifically linked by Aristotle (and the Greek language) to habits6:

5

See the conclusion of Aristotle’s EE account of the voluntary at II.11.1228a
In fact, the word ‘moral’ comes from the Latin ‘mos/moris’ for habit or custom. According to etymonline, Cicero
coined the form ‘moralis’ to translate the Greek ethikos, which Aristotle references in this quotation.
(etymonline.com 2020)
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Now, character (ēthos), as the word itself indicates, is developed from habit (ethos), and
an agent acquires a habit when it eventually becomes operative in a particular fashion as
the result of the repetition of a certain motion under some non-innate impulse. (This is
something we do not see in inanimate agents: a stone, even if you throw it upwards ten
thousand ties, will never do that except by force.) So let character be defined as a quality
governed by the prescriptions of reason, which inheres in that part of the soul which,
although non-rational, is capable of obedience to reason. (EE II.2.1220b1-7)
We learn from this that character is something developed over time in the non-rational part of the
soul as a result of governance by the rational part of the soul—the non-rational part of the soul
“becomes operative in a particular fashion as the result of the repetition of a certain motion under
some [impulse which is not innate to the non-rational].”
Later, he specifies what he means to indicate by as the part of the soul in which character
inheres. He says “the [non-intellectual characteristics] belong to the part of the soul that is nonrational but capable of desire (for not every part of the soul, supposing it to be divisible, has
desire). It follows that a character is vicious or virtuous by pursuing or avoiding certain pleasures
or pains” (II.4.1221b31-34). Below I will show that Aristotle takes the rational part of the soul
to influence desire by presenting as pleasant or painful certain ends in view of the future. On
Aristotle’s view expressed here, it is in the pursuit as pleasant those of things which the rational
part of the soul has correctly presented as proper ends that virtuous character exists. To
recognize these as pleasant, the non-rational part of the soul must be properly disposed to find
pleasurable a certain type of end (the right one, that is). The state of being disposed toward a
certain emotion in a certain way is a characteristic.
Character, therefore, is composed of characteristics. Of characteristics, he gives functionally
identical definitions in both EE and EN which first consider and then rule out emotions (pathe)
and possession of capacities (dunamis) before determining that characteristics are states or
dispositions (hexis):
The capacities are the faculties in virtue of which we can be said to be liable to the
emotions, for example, capable of feeling anger or pain or pity. The dispositions are the
formed states of character in virtue of which we are well or ill disposed in respect of the
emotions; for instance, we have a bad disposition in regard to anger if we are disposed to
get angry too violently or not violently enough, a good disposition if we habitually feel a
moderate amount of anger; and similarly in respect of the other emotions. (EN 1105b2429)7
7

I quote from Rackham’s translation here rather than Ostwald’s. I find Ostwald’s language in this passage to be
disjointed.
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In other words, while a characteristic is not simply the ability to feel emotions, it is the
disposition to feel a certain emotion in a certain way toward a certain object.
2. Character and the Voluntary
In both EE and EN, Aristotle opens his discussions of the voluntary immediately after his
definitions of character and characteristics. And, in both works, he makes clear that he takes it to
be the case that “both virtue and vice must concern things that are voluntary” (EE II.6.1223a20).
In other words, we want to know what is voluntary because we want to know what comes from
character. Take the beginning of EN III.1:
Virtue or excellence is, as we have seen, concerned with emotions and actions. When
these are voluntary, we receive praise and blame; when involuntary, we are pardoned and
sometimes even pitied. Therefore, it is, I dare say, indispensable for a student of virtue to
differentiate between voluntary and involuntary actions, and useful also for lawgivers, to
help them in meting out honors and punishments. (1109b30-35)
Here, though he takes an unconventional approach, it seems fairly clear that Aristotle means to
contextualize his account of the voluntary as a way to determine what is representative of an
agent’s character.8
I urge my reader to hold in mind the close connection that Aristotle has drawn between
pleasure and pain, desire, character, and the voluntary.
3. What Aristotle is not doing
Some commentators have taken two specific portions of Aristotle’s opening to EN III.1 to lay out
his particular concerns with and methodological approaches to defining the voluntary. One
position reads “also useful for lawgivers” to indicate that Aristotle’s intended purpose of this
section was not to give a philosophical exposition of the voluntary but to simply bring a
discussion of voluntariness into a legal context. Another takes Aristotle to be trying to build an
account of the voluntary from what is commonly praised or blamed.
I do not think that the first position is essentially far from the truth, but I do believe that some
commentators have taken it too far. Some, for example, takes Aristotle’s focus on a legal
definition of voluntariness in EN to have resulted in a clearer and more robust exposition than EE,
with different conclusions arrived at for different reasons. I think that the claim that Aristotle
would conclude that different things are true of one topic depending on to whom he writes is
ridiculous.
8

The unconventional approach he takes here might be explained, as Sauvé Meyer has proposed, to come from
Aristotle’s presupposition of many of the moves he makes in EE II.
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Rosalind Hursthouse has a more incendiary response, with which I do not wholeheartedly
disagree: “At least part of the reason why people produce and accept such nonsense is that they
think about moral or legal responsibility and what Aristotle might be construed as saying about
that instead of thinking carefully about what is actually in the text. This presents its own
interesting problems which are generally overlooked” (1984a). I do, though, agree that Aristotle
seems to have tailored the style of his exposition in EN to suit a different sort of audience than
EE.
In regard to the second claim—that Aristotle is trying to build a definition of the voluntary from
what is commonly praised or blamed—I hope it will become clear to my reader not long after the
beginning of my next section why this view is untenable. As F.A. Siegler puts it, “when
Aristotle talks of praising and blaming, he clearly seems concerned with the phenomenon of
blameworthiness (desert of blame) and not merely with the phenomenon of bestowing
(expressing) blame” (1968, 269-70).
Now that we have clarified what it is Aristotle is trying to accomplish by defining what is
voluntary and what is not at this point in his Ethics, we are prepared for our attempt to make
sense of what has not yet been understood: what, exactly, Aristotle means when he say
‘voluntary’.
IV. EE II.6: The Principle of Responsibility
The first problem faced by those who would understand Aristotle’s account of the
voluntary (hekousion) is that of determining where to start. Aristotle speaks explicitly of the
voluntary in several different places: Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, Book II of the
Eudemian Ethics, briefly in De Motu Animalium9, and also in one of the three books that is
shared in common between EE and EN (Book IV and V of the respective volumes). I think that
Sarah Broadie is right to look for Aristotle’s defining principle of voluntary action in his
exposition on the basis of causal responsibility in EE II.6 (1991, 149-159). In fact, I think that
Aristotle takes EE II.6 to completely define the voluntary. And once Aristotle’s theories on
animal motion as given in De Anima and De Motu Animalium are presupposed, then one has a
complete definition of Aristotle’s voluntary as it applies to motion and action, as well. 10
9
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Perhaps desire, which I will show to define voluntary motion and action, is also necessary for an understanding of
voluntary states and sufferings. If this is the case, then DA and MA must be presupposed in EE II.6 to complete
Aristotle’s definition of the voluntary in general as well as in its application to action and motion.
10
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Only once this defining principle is in place and fully understood can we appropriately
move forward in our investigation to an exploration of how Aristotle derives the conclusions he
gives through the rest of the ethics (and in MA). When we have reached that point in our inquiry,
I will begin with the remainder of the EE account, relying on Sauvé Meyer’s understanding of its
dialectic structure and observation that EN presupposes the conclusions of EE (especially, I
argue, EE II.6) (2011, 59-87), then I will move to the shared chapters before examining the EN
account.11
I think that several interpreters have successfully clarified Aristotle’s main points in this
section. Given that, I do not feel the need to expound these conclusions in great detail. However,
since I contend that this chapter contains all of his definition, I feel compelled to examine certain
portions in greater detail. Hence, I will first offer a summary of Broadie’s conclusions, and then
highlight those parts of the chapter which will become important later.
1. Sarah Broadie: ‘It depends on him’
In searching for some principle on which to ground Aristotle’s oft-repeated
characterization of voluntary actions as those which are neither forced nor due to ignorance,
Broadie turns to a phrase which “makes a quiet first appearance” in EN III.1, but which “is
carefully grounded from the start” of the EE account. She articulates this phrase as “it depends
on the agent whether or not he ø’s,” where ø stands for the particular action12 (149).
She gives two expansions of this in order to highlight what Aristotle would take to be
salient features in the case of a sentient creature originating motion or action: a) “Aristotle
assumes, I think, that the ‘Yes’ is ‘Yes-instead-of-No’, and the ‘No’ a ‘No-instead-of-Yes’”
(153); and b) “F depends on him if and only if it is the case that (1) if F occurs it will be because
he says ‘Yes’, and if F does not occur it will be because he says ‘No’; and (2) he is aware of this
and able to envisage F and not-F as possible options for him” (154)13.
When referring to agents and effects of these natures—where the agent is the controlling
(kurios) source of the effect—Aristotle uses the terms archê and aitios interchangeably, to say
that the agent is the origin ultimately responsible for the effect. Thus, in any relation that fits the
11

While I disagree with the reasoning Charles (2012) gives to justify his conclusion that this is the order in which
the texts must have developed, I agree with his conclusion that the shared chapters (EE IV/EN V.8-11) must have
been written after EE II and before EN III.
12
As Broadie notes, this phrase appears in some translations as “it is within the agent’s power,” rather than “it
depends on the agent.”
13
It is essential to understand that Broadie (and Aristotle) does not mean that the agent must be actively aware that F
and not-F are possible options, but that it is/was available to the agent to become aware of F and not-F as options.
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condition, “it depends on A whether F or not-F comes to be,” A is appropriately said to be the
responsible cause.
2. Action, motion, and production
One of the first things that Aristotle specifies in II.6 is that “a human being, alone among
animals, is a source of [action] (praxis)14, for we would not ascribe [action] to any of the others.”
One might be led to understand, based on the primacy of this statement, that Aristotle intends the
rest of the chapter to discuss human action only15. However, Aristotle proceeds to discuss
sources of mathematical truth, sources of motion (kinesis), and any sort of production (poiew).
While he is primarily concerned with human action, since this exposition interrupts an ethical
treatise, he ultimately lays out a definition of causal responsibility which he then applies
specifically to action.
3. Virtue and vice: the connection to action
Only at 1223a10 does Aristotle return the focus of the discussion to action. It is here that
he begins to situate this metaphysical exposition within his ethical treatise:
Since virtue and vice and the works (ergon) that are their expressions are praised or
blamed as the case may be (for blame and praise are not given on account of things that
come about by necessity (ananke) or chance (tuche) or nature (phusis), but on account of
things that we ourselves are responsible for, since if someone else is responsible for
something, it is he who gets the blame and praise), it is clear that virtue and vice have to
do with matters where the man himself is the responsible source of his actions (aitios kai
archê praxewn). (1223a10-15)
For clarity, I have mapped out the moves Aristotle makes in this section of argument:
(a) For someone to be praised or blamed for something, the one receiving the praise or
blame must be responsible for that thing.
(b) We are praised and blamed for virtue and vice and their works (ergon)
(c) Therefore, we must be responsible for our own virtue, vice, and whatever comes from
those.
Notice that Aristotle says we are praised and blamed not only for the works that express virtue
and vice (which he may be taken to classify as actions), but also for the states (hexis) of virtue
and vice themselves16. We can add states to the list of non-actions for which one might be
causally responsible.
14

For concerns I will address later, Kenny renders praxis as ‘conduct’ in this chapter alone. For clarity and
consistency, and because I do not take Aristotle to be using the term equivocally, I use the usual translation ‘action.’
15
One might also expect some explanation from Aristotle as to why no other living beings are sources of action.
Later, I attempt to give Aristotle’s missing explanation.
16
See 1227b5-10, where Aristotle defines virtue as “moral state expressed in choice of the mean (ethiken hexin
prohairetiken mesotetos).”
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Aristotle also offers three other things that might be said to be responsible causes:
necessity (ananke), chance (tuche), and nature (phusis). All three of these will come up later as I
work through some of the more confusing conclusions that Aristotle draws. In fact, it is ananke
which appears in one puzzle which shows up in multiple places throughout Aristotle’s
discussions of voluntary action under the name ‘compulsion’.
4. Responsibility and the voluntary
Finally, we learn that Aristotle takes a human’s status as the responsible cause to be
biconditional with status as voluntary17:
We must then ascertain just what are the actions of which he is the responsible source.
Now, we all agree that each man is responsible for things that are voluntary and in
accordance with his own choice (prohairesis), but that if they are non-voluntary then he
is not responsible. It is evident that whatever he does by choice, he does voluntarily. It is
clear, then, that both virtue and vice must concern things that are voluntary. (1223a15-20)
I have bolded a certain ‘and’ in order to point out an attempt to clarify what might seem like a
terminological ambiguity. The portion in question might mean one of two things: i) ‘a person is
responsible only for those things which are done voluntarily and through choice’; or ii) ‘a person
is responsible for something done voluntarily and a person is responsible for something done
through choice’. But we see in the next sentence that Aristotle only connects voluntariness to
choice in the following sentence. I take this to indicate that (ii) is the proper reading: that either
voluntary or choice would indicate responsibility. Choice is then said to be a subset of the
voluntary, so that voluntary on its own becomes biconditional with responsible in the case of
human causes.
The final sentence recalls the connection Aristotle draws between choice and virtue or
vice; namely that virtue and vice are states of (or dispositions toward) choosing well and poorly,
respectively. Since everything chosen is voluntary, and virtue and vice are dispositions toward
choosing in a certain way, then virtue and vice must concern only what is within the scope of the
voluntary.
One crucial move that many interpreters overlook is exactly how Aristotle introduces the
voluntary. He concludes first that virtue and vice have only to do with those things for which a
person is causally responsible. Then, he says “we must then ascertain just what are the actions of
17

It would be inappropriate to call voluntary some responsible causes, like the gods. But animals would seem to all
be voluntary whenever they are responsible causes. I will not repeat this specification every time I reference the
relationship between voluntariness and causal responsibility.
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which he is the responsible source.” To answer that question, he states that “each man is
responsible for things that are voluntary.” He seems already to have in mind some definition of
the voluntary, on which he bases the biconditional relation of voluntariness and responsibility as
well as the following claim that all chosen things are voluntary.18
It seems to me that Aristotle’s move here is to say, ‘since we have a better grasp on what
is voluntary than on what the scope of causal responsibility is, but we know that the two are
coextensive, let us define the scope of causal responsibility by reference to the voluntary.’
The next chapter thus begins with Aristotle saying “So we must ascertain what the
voluntary is…” Again, I contend that Aristotle already has some defining principle in mind and,
following Meyer (2011), EE II.7-11 is Aristotle’s dialectical attempt to establish that conclusion
(though, while he succeeds in refuting some views, he does not seem to articulate one positive
principle). I think that we already have enough information, based on Aristotle’s connection of
the voluntary to causal responsibility and his examination of how humans and animals might
cause action and motion in DA and MA, to articulate this conclusion. We will move forward
under the provisional definition: F is voluntary if and only if it depends on the agent whether F or
not-F comes to be.
V. Praxis Defined
To fully comprehend Aristotle’s conclusions in EE II.6, two questions must be answered:
(i) What is action (praxis)? and (ii) What is the source of action such that a human may be a
responsible cause of action(and therefore act voluntarily)? As I will go on to demonstrate in this
section, Aristotle answers the first question by defining an action as something in accordance
with an end. In other words, action is essentially teleological. His answer to the second
question is simpler than many would put it: action begins with desire for an end conceived in
imagination which is connected by practical intellect to an immediate motion—the performance
of this motion and actualization of the end, considered together, is action. Since an inanimate
object cannot move itself, it can certainly not be the source of action, and since non-human
animals have neither a rational imagination nor practical intellect, but do have desire, they can
move themselves, but do not begin actions.
1. Telos and hou heneka:

18

In the following sections, I contend that may be found in De Anima and De Motu Animalium and make explicit
what Aristotle takes ‘voluntary’ to mean.
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Much of the arguments that follow rely on a sophisticated grasp of the two terms by
which Aristotle names the final cause: the noun telos and the preposition heneka. Each
emphasizes those aspects of the nature of a final cause that the other fails to capture. The phrase
‘hou heneka,’ often translated ‘that for the sake of which,’ describes the final cause of something
according to its role as the reason for the existence for that thing and that toward which the
thing’s being aims.
Were Aristotle’s final cause referred to only as hou heneka, one might be tempted to
think of the final cause of something as separate from the thing itself. But, as the meaning
introduced by the inclusion of the word telos indicates, that would be inappropriate. Telos is
often translated as ‘end,’ but, while technically correct, this fails to capture the term’s full
specificity of meaning. A thing’s telos is the thing’s fully complete or consummate state—it is
not something separate from the thing, but instead the thing, fully actualized.
For Aristotle, hou heneka and telos are one. That is to say, fulfillment of that for the sake
of which a thing exists is the complete actualization of itself, and the complete actualization of
itself is the aim of the thing and that for the sake of which the thing exists. I will render hou
heneka alternately as ‘that for the sake of which x exists’ or ‘the aim of x,’ using whichever
English syntax dictates. Since I find no common translation of telos to satisfactorily capture this
sense of completion, I will leave it untranslated, reserving ‘end’ for when I would like to refer to
both aspects of the final cause together.
2. Metaphysics IX.6: The teleological taxonomy of action
A significant portion of the scholarship focused on this section of Aristotle’s Metaphysics
(IX.6.1048b18-35) focuses on Aristotle’s distinction between motion (kinesis) and activity
(energeia). My primary concern in analyzing this section, though, is to make absolutely clear the
fact that Aristotle defines action (praxis), of which both motion and activity are species, in
teleological terms. Any conception of an action which excludes the actions end is therefore not a
coherent conception of that action.
Aristotle opens the passage by dividing the genus of action into two species and
exemplifying the first:
Since of the actions which have a limit none is a telos but all are relative to the telos, e.g.
the process of making thin is of this sort, and the things themselves when one is making
them thin are in movement in this way (i.e. without being already that at which the
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movement aims (hou heneka)), this is not an action or at least not a complete one (for it is
not a telos); but that in which the telos is present is an action. (1048b18-23)
We see here the initial specification of one species of action: actions which have a limit, and
which have ends but are not themselves ends. This leaves as the second species all actions which,
being themselves ends, have no limit. The first, as we will see, Aristotle identifies as complete
motion, the second as activity.
Aristotle follows this division by clarifying in what ways a motion might qualify as an
action. He gives an example of an incomplete motion, naming a process (making things thin)
which involves objects in motion and specifying that the process has not yet reached its aim.
Because the aim has not been fulfilled and the objects are still in motion, Aristotle excludes the
exemplified process from the genus of action. For an action is “that in which the telos is present.”
Only once the process has been completed—once the motion has achieved the aim, only then is
it an action. We see even that the whole process was defined in the first place by reference to its
end: “the process of making thin.” When the motion is taken independently of its end, there is
no action.
An action of this first species—a complete motion—is the unified whole of a motion with
the state of completion it has realized as its end. Why, if this species is characterized as
complete motion, does Aristotle first identify this species as “the actions which have a limit,”
before making any reference to ends? Simply put, a motion (and not, as we will see, an activity),
ceases when it achieves completion. Its completed state does not undergo change—there is no
longer any motion. Unless the incomplete portions of the process are being specifically
identified separately from the completion, there is no longer any motion, but action.
Aristotle leaves it to his reader to infer the properties of the remaining species of action
before moving on to the series of examples that has become known as Aristotle’s ‘tense test,’
where he names the opposing species ‘activities.’ What exactly is the distinction Aristotle means
to draw in the tense test is not immediately clear due to struggles with translating Greek grammar
and syntax19, and ostensible contradictions of certain elements of the distinction in other works20.
But, if one begins by examining the other side of the distinction with which Aristotle opens the
passage, it becomes clear that the goal of the tense test is not to define the other species of action
19

“States and Performances: Aristotle’s Test” (Graham 1980)
“The Energeia-Kinesis Distinction and Aristotle’s Conception of Praxis” (Hagen 1984), 264; “Aristotle’s
Distinction Between Energeia and Kinesis” (Ackrill 1965)
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but to exemplify a definition which has already, in a way, been given. Since we have already an
understanding of one side of the following: “of the actions which have a limit none is a telos,”
we ought derive from that an understanding of the other. If the species of action known as
complete motion includes all those actions which have limits and are not ends, the other species
must be themselves ends and not have limits.
These are activities: they are always complete and contain no motion whatsoever. In
every instant of an activity’s performance, it has already fulfilled its aim, for the aim of the
performance of an activity is, simply speaking, the performance of the activity. Neither is there
some motion to cease when the activity is completed, nor is there any stopping-point inherent in
the activity itself. Thus, Aristotle defines each of the two species of action in teleological terms.
An instance of each must be described according to its end, for an activity is an end and, if one
were to describe an action from the first species by excluding its end, he would be describing the
motion, not the action21. It ought be clear from this how Aristotle would deal with the subject of
action individuation.
With the understanding in place that Aristotelian action essentially includes the action’s
end, we are prepared to move on either to an analysis of the tense test on that foundation or to
what is more relevant to my thesis: an exploration of the source of action. Since I am concerned
here only with establishing the teleology of action in general, I will say no more about the tense
test other than that the reading which follows on this foundation closely resembles the one
endorsed by Charles Hagen: “it is fitting that the basis [of distinction] has turned out to be
teleological in that most teleological of philosophers” (1984, 280).
3. The Ethics on action
Those who are already familiar with Aristotle must already feel assured that he tends not
to go to such lengths to define a term in one work and then ignore that definition in others. That
this is true in the case of praxis is made explicitly clear in EN, when Aristotle discusses the
relation between pleasure, motion, and activity (X.4). First, he determines that pleasure cannot be
motion, for it is like the activity of seeing, and seeing “lacks nothing which has to develop later
in order to make complete the specific form” (1174a17) But “all motion—take building, for
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This is the foundation on which Broadie (1991, 137) and Coope (2007) base their positions on how Aristotle
might cope with the question popular in contemporary philosophy of action: “What is the difference between ‘my
arm rising’ and ‘me raising my arm’?” Importantly, Coope observes that, for Aristotle, an action is the causing of a
state (the state of completion).
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example—takes place in time and is directed at an end; it is complete only when it has
accomplished that at which it aims […] the parts and individual moments of any action are
incomplete” (a19-22).22
He claims that pleasure is not an activity, like seeing, but something that completes an
activity when it “superimposes itself upon it, like the bloom of youth in those who are in their
prime” (b33) Somewhat tangentially, but interestingly, this leads to the conclusion that “there is
no pleasure without activity, and every activity is completed by pleasure” (1175a20). Pleasure is
included in the actualization of whatever is being exercised in the activity. This would seem
sufficient to support the use of Aristotle’s technical, teleological definition of action in an
explanation of EE and EN.
VI. Orexis and Telos: the Causes
The next item for investigation is the question, “what is the source of action?”23
Fortunately Aristotle has answered this question in at least three places: DA III, MA, and CE
V/VI.2. Most truly, Aristotle says in each place, desire for ends (orexis), operating through
choice (prohairesis), is the starting point of action.
I contend that it is this answer, taken with the definition of action given above, which
unlocks the understanding of why Aristotle draws each conclusion he does about the voluntary as
it instantiates in actions, and not simply why one might24. Two recent commentators have
stopped just short of realizing the full force of what follows from these two accounts. Sauvé
Meyer seems on the brink of this insight in the final chapter of her book, Aristotle on Moral
Responsibility (2011), but answers one crucial question wrong and thus fails to have an essential
insight.
David Charles even identifies Aristotle’s focus on choice (prohairesis; the connection
between desire and action) in his EE II and EN III accounts of the voluntary in “The Eudemian
Ethics on the Voluntary” (2012), gives a thorough examination of the faculty of desire in
22

1174a19-30 gives the example of building a temple, where the complete motion (action) is the construction of the
temple, while the individual tasks, like fitting the stones together, fluting the column, laying the foundation, and
making the triglyph.
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Contra Broadie (1991), who claims that such a turn would be considered by Aristotle to be inappropriate on the
basis that Aristotle does not bring it up himself, and presumably with reference to Aristotle’s note about precision in
EN I.5. As I have mentioned, I take Aristotle to omit specific reference to the discussion of orexis as the source of
action because he feels it has been sufficiently covered.
24
As noted in my introduction, I am not yet sure whether this can be appropriately expanded to serve as the
Aristotelian principle for the voluntary in general, or if the inclusion of a discussion of desire is only appropriate
when considering voluntary action.
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“Aristotle’s Desire” (2006), but stops short before following the implications, instead favoring an
examination of the differences between the two accounts from a legal standpoint.25
Over the course of this section, a new definition of Aristotelian voluntary action will emerge
which underlies his position on force and ignorance, as well as his otherwise-confusing
conclusions about necessity (ananke) and non-voluntary actions (oukh hekousion): an action is
voluntary if and only if the action’s responsible cause is the agent’s desire for that action’s real
end. The sections which follow this one will be devoted to establishing this definition’s
consistency with Aristotle’s accounts in EE II, EN III, and CE IV/V. Once that has been
established, I will move on to an examination of necessity and Aristotle’s non-voluntary
distinction in light of this definition.
1. Terms
Translations of Aristotle’s ethical and psychological works have not adopted consistent
ways of rendering four terms which will be encountered in this section: orexis, epithumia,
logismos, and bouleuw. In fact, some translations use one word to translate the first two, and
another single word to translate the second two; some adopt multiple renderings but use them
interchangeably. If, though, one does not keep straight which word has been used by Aristotle,
his work becomes unintelligible. To accomplish this, I will adopt the following renderings:
desire (orexis), appetite (epithumia), calculation (logismos), and deliberation (bouleuw). I will
replace alternate renderings in translations where necessary to maintain absolute consistency.
2. De Anima III.7-1126
Aristotle characterizes the faculty of desire (orektikon) as the faculty by which the soul
pursues or avoids some object which is presented in imagination (phantasia). This object of
desire is always an end. This might happen a) without the input of reason whatsoever, b) with
the input of reason in the calculating stage when the object of desire is connected to some
motion27, or c) when the object presented to desire is determined by reason and then connected to
motion through calculation.
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Charles concludes that the EE II account confusingly tries to mediate between a focus on choice and “a unifying,
but problematic and underspecified, idea of nature as the basis” (2012, 26). As we shall see, this is not, ultimately,
what Aristotle’s EE account does.
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My project in this section is to provide an sketch of Aristotle’s conclusions about desire (orexis) in De Anima.
For an exploration of the whole account, see Charles (2006)
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In some places, Aristotle seems committed to this view, while in others he seems to think that calculation can only
proceed when the end is determined by reason.
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In (a) and (b), the object is given through sensation to imagination, which receives the
form of the thing sensed, while in (c) the object is conjured in imagination by intellect (nous),
possibly in reaction to something sensed, though not always. When calculation is involved,
desire pursues the object through action (431b5-11).
Every desire, too, is for the sake of something (hou heneka), for it is for the object of
desire which is the starting-point (archê) of the practical intellect, and the last <step
reached by the practical intellect> is the beginning (archê) of action. So it is with good
reason that these two—desire and practical thought (dianoia praktike)—appear to be the
moving28 causes (archê); for what causes motion is the [faculty of desire], and it is
through this that thought causes motion. (433a16-20)
When the object is not given to desire by intellect, it is given by desire itself. When the object is
given by intellect, the desire is wish (boulesis), while the other desires are appetite (epithumia)
and spirit (thumos).29 Because both desire and intellect can determine desire’s ends, Aristotle
sometimes refers to both as sources of action. We will see this tendency come up again when
calculation and deliberation are brought up in the Ethics. But he notes that desire is most truly
said to be the source of action because desire can impart movement contrary to intellect (as in the
case of incontinence), while intellect must impart movement through desire. Desire is, therefore,
present in all cases and is the efficient cause of action.
We have also now seen that Aristotle considers the object of desire to be the final cause
of the action—the telos and hou heneka. Through the faculty of desire, this object “causes
motion by being thought or imagined and is not <itself> in motion” (433b11). Here we have the
key which Sauvé Meyer seemed to be searching for when she asked the question “since the
moved mover’s (desire) causal activity is itself a movement, we must ask, what mover moved it”
(2011, 152). It is from an understanding of Aristotle’s answer to Meyer’s question—that the
final cause of an action, which is its ultimate origin, is the object of desire that is held in the
agent’s imagination30—that Aristotle’s various accounts of voluntariness will all be shown to
derive.
3. The principle of responsibility in action
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The moving cause is also known as the efficient cause. I use the latter, but will not change alternate translations.
This is not as clear as one might wish in DA, where thumos is mentioned only in passing, but made explicit in MA
6.700b15-29.
30
This model of desire is consistently given by Aristotle throughout his body of work. See Met I.3, XII.7; MA 6;
Phys II.3; as well as EN VI.2
29
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Having now established Aristotle’s understanding of the structure of human action, we
can revise our provisional definition from EE II.6. There, Aristotle said: F is voluntary if and
only if it depends on the agent whether F or not-F comes to be. Now, we can understand the way
that this principal applies to motion and action: motion F is voluntary if and only if it depends on
the agent’s desire whether F or not-F comes to be. A stronger articulation of its application to
action, which places stronger emphasis on what will later become salient, is as follows: an action
is voluntary if and only if the action’s responsible cause is the agent’s desire for that action’s real
end.31
4. Character in action
Earlier, we saw that Aristotle considers character to be a habituated “quality governed by
the prescriptions of reason, which inheres in that part of the soul which, although non-rational, is
capable of obedience to reason;” the part of the soul which is the seat of character is also the seat
of desire, and one’s character is made up of one’s dispositions toward finding certain types of
objects pleasant or painful (EE II.2.1220b1-7; 4.1221b31).
Meyer attempted to answer her question about the unmoved mover in human action on the basis
of the agent’s character. But, as we have saw, Aristotle explicitly named the final cause of the
action (the object of desire) as the unmoved mover. However, Meyer does not make an
inference that is any way inappropriate, Aristotle takes character to be a disposition toward
desiring certain objects. Character does not cause the agent to select a certain end, it simply is
the agent’s repeated selection of a certain type of end—that is, toward a certain type of thing as
the unmoved mover of the agent’s action.
After consulting De Anima, we now understand two further things about desire’s
relationship to character: i) desire simply is the pursuit of an object that happens when that object
is seen as pleasant, and ii) reason cannot ‘influence’ desire as such but may present ends to it as
pleasant. To review: one’s character determines what sorts of objects one sees as pleasant; what
one sees as pleasant is the object of desire, and desire is simply the pursuit of its object (motion
or action, in other words); the object of desire is the first cause of motion. Therefore, the
motions and actions toward which one is disposed are determined by the objects which one is
disposed to find pleasant or painful—i.e. one’s character. One’s motions and actions, if one is
31

As I have stated before, I am as yet unsure whether this revision of the defining principle as it applies to action
also underlies the voluntariness of states. If it does underly the voluntariness of states, it must be through actions
which cause those states to come to be.
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causally responsible for them, which is equivalent in this context to their being voluntary, are
quite literally the works (ergon) of one’s character.
We now have a much deeper and clearer understanding of what Aristotle means by
‘voluntary’, and we have learned something about the development of character along the way:
The disposition that is a characteristic develops over time through repetition of certain types of
motion, and can therefore be governed in its development by reason, if reason often succeeds in
its presentation of ends to desire. This would imply that, through the process of habituation, the
non-rational parts of one’s soul become themselves disposed towards what is good. That is to
say, the perfectly virtuous person finds the virtuous course of action pleasant in itself without
even requiring the input of reason.
VII. Application
What is most compelling about the principle I am proposing is that it grants us the ability
to understand just why Aristotle has come to the following conclusions about voluntary action: 1)
that actions performed due to ignorance are not voluntary, 2) that we should consider there to be
a third classification between voluntary and involuntary called non-voluntary, and 3) that actions
performed under necessity (ananke) are ultimately voluntary. In this section I will briefly
consider these conclusions in light of Aristotle’s definition of voluntary action: an action is
voluntary if and only if the action’s responsible cause is the agent’s desire for that action’s real
end.
1. Due to ignorance
At first this definition might seem to obscure rather than clarify Aristotle’s claim that
actions performed due to ignorance are involuntary. For if the agent initiates the movement,
which the agent certainly does even when ignorant, the agent is surely causally responsible, right?
But Aristotle does seem at some points to take this, too, to derive from his claims about causal
responsibility. And, if the ignorant agent is not causally responsible, then what is?
Recall the structure of action; specifically, the structure of actions which are composed of
motion (kinesis) and end, for these seem to be the only actions which can come from an ignorant
agent. Aristotle’s paradigmatic examples of activity (energeia), like seeing and thinking,
certainly cannot be done unknowingly.32 It will be useful here to consider separately the action
as desired and the action as realized. An action of the relevant species is composed of a set of
32
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incomplete motions and a state of completion which is their end (telos and hou heneka). This
end is the final cause of the action. When we consider the end of the action that has been
performed, we are considering what we shall call final cause R. When we consider the end of
the action that is desired, we are considering the first origin of the action, which is what must
belong to the agent for the agent to be causally responsible. Let us call this final cause D. If and
only if D and R match—if and only if the state of affairs that is the object of the agent’s desire
which is the first origin of the action is the state of affairs that is realized—can the agent be said
to be causally responsible for R.
But Aristotle cites six particular items from which unawareness of any qualifies as the
proper type of ignorance:
(1) Who the agent is, (2) what he is doing, (3) what thing or person is affected, and
sometimes also (4) the means he is using, e.g., some tool, (5) the result (heneka tinos), e.g.
saving a life, and (6) the manner in which he acts, e.g., gently or violently. (1111a3-6)
For the action to be voluntary, the agent must not be ignorant of any of these. Aristotle
emphasizes two of the items listed as being most central to the action: (3) the thing or person
affected and (5) the result of the action (heneka tinos). Clearly, though, any item on the list
would alter the result which the action will lead to.
So, in all cases of action performed due to ignorance, the agent is not aware of the result
(hou heneka) toward which the real action aims—that is, the real final cause, R. It follows
necessarily that the real final cause of the real action cannot be the same as the object of the
agent’s desire, D. Since action must be defined by reference to its end, the action that has been
performed and the action that the agent desired by definition cannot even be referred to as the
same action. D and R do not match: the agent cannot be the responsible cause of the action that
has come to be realized.
But the agent’s desire is still the responsible cause of the agent’s motion. Even if the end
as desired and the end that is realized do not match, the agent’s motion which she produced as a
result of her desire does still come from her desire.
If pressed to give an account of the cause responsible for the action that has come to be
realized, Aristotle might turn to tuche, which is sometimes called luck, sometimes chance, and
sometimes fortune. Indeed, in CE IV/V.8 Aristotle refers to these as atuchēma, or ‘misfortunes’.
In Physics II.5, Aristotle gives an account of how an action might come to be out of chance
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(tuche). His example looks particularly likely to fit under the criteria for an action performed
due to ignorance given in EN III.
2. Non-voluntary
One development that Aristotle introduces in EN III which was not obviously present in
EE33 is the introduction of a third classification of actions as regards the voluntary: nonvoluntary (oukh hekousion; literally ‘not voluntary’). Some interpreters seem to struggle to come
to terms with this new distinction that Aristotle has made and wantonly criticize it. What seems
to be the problem is that these interpreters failure to let go of the conviction that the Greek
hekousion and akousion must be contradictories (one must be true while the other must be false)
rather than contraries (the two cannot be true at the same time). This seems silly, since what
Aristotle is doing is providing his own definition of the words and defining them clearly as
contraries. Aristotle is, in fact, coining a term to describe an agent whose desire did not cause a
certain action, but was not in any way in conflict with that action.
If we, in the words of Hursthouse, “reject the explanation that his invoking it at all was a
stupid blunder,” then we might make some progress into discovering how Aristotle lays out this
definition (1984b, 256). He introduces this new classification when treating actions which are
performed due to ignorance:
Turning now to acts due to ignorance, we may say that all of them are non-voluntary
(oukh hekousion), but they are involuntary (akousion) only when they bring sorrow and
regret in their train: a man who has acted due to ignorance and feels no compunction
whatsoever for what he has done was not a voluntary agent, since he did not know what
he was doing, nor yet was he involuntary, inasmuch as he feels no sorrow. There are,
therefore, two distinct types of acts due to ignorance: a man who regrets what he has
done is considered an involuntary agent, and a man who does not may be called a nonvoluntary agent. (EN III.1.1110b17-24)
Aristotle appears to rely entirely on the ignorant agent’s emotional reaction when made aware of
the real end of the action to differentiate between non- and in-voluntariness. It does not seem to
me that Aristotle is so lazy of a philosopher as to have not used the agent’s emotional reaction
simply as an indication of an underlying characteristic—a disposition towards desiring certain
objects.
When an agent feels regret after learning of the consequence of her action, this is because
that action was contrary to her desire. Since Aristotle seems to be addressing a comparatively
33
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non-philosophical audience in EN, it is not surprising that he would restrict his explanation to the
outward indicators of the underlying principle—the underlying principle of the non-voluntary
being this: an action is non-voluntary if and only if the agent is not causally responsible for the
action. This is the contradictory of the voluntary; it must be true every time an action is not
voluntary.
Now, Aristotle might be doing one of two things here. He might be classifying the
involuntary as a subset of the non-voluntary, or he might be separating the two, so that there are
three classifications on equal footing: the voluntary, the non-voluntary, and the involuntary. I
am of the view that Aristotle is doing the former: setting the voluntary and the non-voluntary
against each other while the involuntary is a subset of the non-voluntary. This is supported by an
oft-overlooked sentence in an oft-overlooked chapter, EE II.6: “if they are non-voluntary then he
is not responsible” (1223a17). Non-voluntary does, in fact, appear in EE, and it does so as the
contradictory of the voluntary.
If the principle of the non-voluntary is that the agent is not causally responsible for the
action, the principle for the involuntary (indicated by the agents regret for the action) is this: an
action is involuntary if and only if the agent is not causally responsible for the action and the
action is against the agent’s desire. Sarah Broadie refers to this as the ‘counter-voluntary’.
Questions have arisen concerning why Aristotle does not speak of forced actions as nonvoluntary. There are two ways Aristotle might address these. The first is by saying, as he does in
EE II.7, that all forced actions are structurally against the agent’s desire (1223a30). I am not
absolutely sure that Aristotle holds this view, but it is not unlikely. He claims this in a dialectical
premise that is partially refuted, though the relevant portion does go unrefuted, which might be
taken as an indication of his agreement. The other way is one proposed by Hursthouse (1984a):
Aristotle might simply have felt it less important to note the very few cases in which forced
actions might turn out to be wholly consistent with the agent’s desire.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Aristotle’s conception of the difference between and
definitions of non- and in-voluntary actions is better understood on the basis of my proposed
defining principle of voluntary action.
3. Necessity
Finally we arrive at the locus of the most significant disagreement between Aristotle’s EE
and EN accounts: whether actions performed in cases of necessity (ananke) are voluntary or
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whether they are ultimately forced actions (bianon) and therefore not voluntary. Aristotle
characterizes such actions in EE as follows:
When the situation is not under his control, then in a fashion he is acting under force, but
not without qualification. For even if he does not choose what he actually does, he does
choose the thing that is the purpose of his doing it (hou heneka). Even here, cases differ.
If a man were to kill in order to avoid being caught at blind man’s buff, it would be
ridiculous to claim that he acted under force and [necessity]34: it has to be a greater and
more painful evil that he will suffer if he does not do the deed. Thus, he will act under
[necessity]—though [this is not a forced action or against nature]—when he does
something evil for the sake of (heneka agathon) a good, or in order to escape from a
greater evil, and does so involuntarily (akwn), these matters not being under his control.
(II.8.1225a12-19)
Aristotle gives three criteria which an action must fit if it is be considered in this discussion: a)
the agent must not have put herself into the situation, b) the end must be properly worthy of
pursuit or avoidance (pursuit of a good or avoidance of a ‘greater evil’) and c) the means must
not themselves be worthy of pursuit, but they must be not be more worthy of avoidance than the
end (otherwise it would be like a man killing in order to avoid losing a game).
The conclusion Aristotle has often been interpreted as drawing here is that actions in
cases of necessity are involuntary. In fact, what he says is that the agent is involuntary (akwn not
akousion), and he says this in reference to the evil that the agent does for the sake of something
else.

So we should read this not as Aristotle concluding that the whole action is involuntary,

but that the agent is not voluntary in relation to the means—this leaves open the possibility that
the agent is voluntary in relation to the end, by which the action is defined, in which case the
action would be voluntary.
Aristotle all but immediately addresses the issue of actions of necessity in his EN account.
As soon as he has briefly contextualized the discussion of the voluntary and given his two
criteria for identifying actions as not voluntary, he turns to a lengthy discussion of necessity.
Here, he offers a clear example of an action which meets the criteria set out in EE, but for which
the agent clearly deserves praise (which would indicate an underlying belief that it is voluntary).
Consider a sailor who is stuck in a storm on a ship loaded down with passengers and cargo. In
order to save his own life and the life of his fellow passengers, the sailor throws the cargo
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Ananke is often rendered ‘coercion’ rather than its typical meaning, ‘necessity’, by translators of Aristotle’s Ethics,
but only in sections dealing with the voluntary. This obscures the connections which Aristotle means to draw by
using the term ananke. I hope that I have already made clear the significance of Aristotle’s word choice.
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overboard. We are given to understand that he would never have thrown the cargo overboard
otherwise.
“Actions of this kind,” Aristotle says, “are, then, of a mixed nature, although they come
closer to being voluntary than to being involuntary actions. For they are desirable at the moment
of action; and the end for which an action is performed depends on the time at which it is done.”
He refers to the fact that the source (archê) of the motion is within the agent. We now
understand this as the desire for the end of the action. In both texts, Aristotle explicitly identifies
the agent’s rational desire as what determines the end, making it firmly her own. Thus, when
Aristotle concludes that these actions “are voluntary, although in themselves they are perhaps
involuntary, since nobody would choose to do any one of them for its own sake,” we are better
prepared to interpret this.
Aristotle seems to be saying in EN that not only is the action as a whole voluntary, but so
is the motion. If this is so, it is here that we would see disagreement with his position in EE,
rather than disagreement over the status of the action as a whole. This seems like progress for
three reasons: first, it seems strange to say that the whole action (means and end together) is
voluntary while part (the means to the end) is involuntary; second, as Aristotle points out in EN,
it is hard to calculate well in such situations, and how well one does is a worthwhile indicator of
the quality of one’s character35; and third, if the EE position is granted, one might assert that any
set of means to an end is determined by necessity36.
While the means, when considered ‘in themselves’ are, for the situation to qualify as
necessity, not specifically pursuit-worthy, they become so in the situation because they are so
tightly linked to the end that the agent does desire. In any situation there may be a range of
possible motions available to an agent’s choice. Whether the agent chooses the best end and the
best motions as means to that end is telling in regard to the quality of that agent’s character—put
in Aristotle’s EN terms, whether and how much blame or praise the agent deserves for that action
is determined by the agent’s means and end. In fact, because it is so clear that the motions which
the agent performs in such situations must have been chosen on the basis of some further end
(for no normal person would throw cargo overboard without having deliberated on whether that
was worthwhile considering the consequences), Aristotle says these actions “have a greater
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resemblance to voluntary actions,” as long as one considers the action in its full context (1110b6).
To be sure, anyone who would accuse the sailor of wrongdoing for jettisoning the cargo would
be grossly mischaracterizing the action and its agent.
Further, if one were to absolve the agent of responsibility for the means on the grounds
that necessity is an external source (thus being force in an unqualified sense), then this would
equate to claiming that “pleasant and noble acts are performed under [force] because the pleasant
and noble are external to us and have a [necessitating] power. But on this view, all actions
would be done under force: for every man is motivated by what is pleasant and noble in
everything he does” (1110b10-13).
What, then, are we to do with Aristotle’s note in EE II.6 that we are not causally
responsible for (and therefore not voluntary in relation to) “things that come about by necessity
(ananke) or chance or nature” (1223a12)? I have already referenced chance and nature in
support of my position, am I to throw out necessity? On the contrary, it seems that the actions of
which Aristotle has been speaking of as performed out of necessity are not even taken by him (in
the more developed EN position) to be necessitated in an unqualified way. For one certainly has
the option to avoid rather than pursue them. In EE II.6, Aristotle positions necessity, chance, and
nature against the scope of the agent’s causal responsibility. But these actions are clearly within
that scope—It is up to the agent to do F rather than not-F or not-F rather than F. I would contend
that Aristotle means to refer in EE II.6 to cases of unqualified necessity, in which it is (aptly) not
up to the agent to do F rather than not-F or not-F rather than F: For reasons not within the scope
of the agent’s responsibility, she must do F.
VIII. Conclusion; What Remains to be Done
I believe that I have shown my proposed interpretation of Aristotle’s underlying
definition of the voluntary not only to be accurate, but to be useful. Considering the agent’s
desire seems to be exactly what Aristotle means to do. I think that I have also effectively
supported translators’ repeated affirmation of ‘voluntary’ as the appropriate way to render
hekwn/hekousion. For ‘voluntary’ comes from the Latin for ‘will’, which, while it is of contested
meaning, seems an appropriate name by which to refer to Aristotle’s theory of desire. I hope that,
I have also succeeded in illustrating what is lost when one makes the mistakes that have cost
many interpreters before me the prize of comprehension.
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At the beginning of this essay, I brought up three more items that Aristotle specifically
names as voluntary: culpable ignorance, states of character, and receipt of certain actions. As I
have mentioned, interpreters generally take the first two of these to be considered voluntary by
Aristotle because they come about as a result of voluntary action. I have not yet found any
published literature which attempts to deal with Aristotle’s baffling assertion of the third: that we
can receive action voluntarily. I am convinced that none of these need be accounted for by
reference to voluntary action, but that the first two can be proven voluntary simply on Broadie’s
unmodified definition of voluntary as what is causally dependent on the agent.
I suspect that the full extent of the interpretational power one gains from introducing
desire into the voluntariness equation will only become apparent when I show it to reveal how in
the world Aristotle might take one to receive action voluntarily. But this is all work that must
another day.37
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I am conscious of the position articulated in EE II that “the voluntary is not to be defined by desire or choice”
(1225a39). I understand this as having emerged as part of Aristotle’s dialectical examination of whether the
voluntary can be defined by reference to either desire, or choice, or thought alone or whether it must be defined by
all three together. The defining principle which I propose is not inconsistent with Aristotle’s conclusions here.
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